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Abstract 
A multicriteria group choice problem is considered in the paper. The model includes a set of feasible alternatives, a vector 
criterion, and n preference relations of the decision makers (DMs). Each preference relation is a cone relation with corresponding 
properties. It is considered the majority preference relation, as a cone relation constructed upon the cones of the DMs’ preference 
relations. It is shown how to use and aggregate additional information about the DMs’ preference relations in case of three DMs 
and two criteria. The Pareto set of multicriteria problem with “new” vector criterion forms a group choice, which reduces the 
Pareto set of initial multicriteria problem. 
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1. Introduction 
Problems of choice are considered in deferent areas of human life, and most of them are multicriteria. Wishes and 
preferences are extremely varied, even opposite to each other. For example, searching the most profitable solution 
could lead us to the solution with great losses at the same time, and vice versa. 
A multicriteria group choice problem includes a group of decision makers (DMs) with individual preferences, 
which should be aggregated by some method, rule to make a choice
1–8
. The individual preferences can be 
represented by ranking, estimations of experts, preference relations, utility functions. One of the main problem is 
how to make consistent individual preferences, what should be considered as a “good” decision. A. Bergson, 
P. Samuelson proposed a social welfare function as a model of individual aggregation, K. J. Arrow formulated 5 
axioms for individual preference relations, which restricted the “reasonable” group choice, and Arrow paradox is 
said that there is not an aggregation rule satisfied this axioms
1
. M.A. Aizerman  and F.T. Aleskerov proposed the 
axioms of “reasonable” group (collective) choice for individual choice functions2. B.G. Mirkin investigated 
problems of preference descriptions, consistency principle of individual preferences, properties of majority rule and 
its modifications
4
. 
A model considered in the paper includes a set of feasible alternatives, a vector criterion reflecting the goals of 
the group, and preference relations of DMs. Information about preference relation of the DM (the individual 
preferences) is given by “quanta” of information9, 10, so preference relation of the DM is characterized by a convex 
pointed cone, which contains nonnegative orthant, and does not contain the origin. For aggregating the individual 
preference relations is used the majority preference relation, which takes into account at least half intensions of 
members of the group. It is proved that this relation is characterized by the unions of the intersections of different 
subsets selected from the set of cones associated with the DMs’ preference relations. Generally, derived in this way 
cone can be either convex or not. The property of convex is equivalent to transitivity of corresponding relation. Thus, 
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the goal is to construct a convex part of the majority preference relation cone, and it gives the transitive part of this 
relation. 
When there is not any “quantum” of information, the Pareto set forms the group choice, i. e. each DM has not any 
additional information. For three DMs and two components of vector criterion it is considered two cases: when each 
DM have only one “quantum” of information, and when it has two “quanta” of information. And it is established 
what consists the group choice in each case: it is the Pareto set of multicriteria problem with “new” vector criteria, 
and it belongs to the Pareto set of initial multicriteria problem. Note that in one considered situation this choice is 
not unique. It happens, when the cone of the majority preference relation is not convex. 
2. Multicriteria choice model of the DM 
Consider the group consists of n DMs: DM1, …, DMn. A set of feasible alternatives, solutions 
kX R  is a set of 
variants among which the choice should be made by the group. A vector criterion f, defined on X, Y = f(X), reflects 
goals, intensions of the DMs, and it is the same for each DM. Now let us formulate the main objects of multicriteria 
group choice problem: 
 a set of feasible vectors Y; 
 n preference relations  1
Y , …, Yn , defined on Y, of DM1, …, DMn. 
This relations 1
Y , …, Yn  also reflects intensions all DMs but they are not equal to each other, i. e. for any 
{1, , }l n  DMl has its own preference relation 
Y
l , defined on Y. The expression 
(1) (2)Y
ly y  means that when 
considering two vectors y
(1)
, y
(2)
 the DMl chooses y
(1)
 and rejects y
(2)
. 
Suppose that behavior of any DMl is restricted by the axioms of “reasonable” individual choice
9
. They are as 
follows. It is assumed that when considering two possible variants the excluded vector could not be selected from 
the whole set Y as well. To have the opportunity to compare the random vectors (not only from the set Y), and thus 
provide information about the preference relation, it is introduced an irreflexive and transitive continuation 
l
 to the 
entire criterion space mR for the latter. In addition, all components f1, …, fm of vector criterion are compatible with 
preference relation 
l
. The ith criterion fi is called compatible with preference relation l  if for any vectors y
(1)
, y
(2)
 
of the space mR  such that 
(1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1)
1 1 1( , , , , , , )i i i my y y y y y , 
(2) (1) (1) (2) (1) (1)
1 1 1( , , , , , , )i i i my y y y y y , 
(1) (2)
i iy y , the 
relation 
(1) (2)
ly y  holds. It means that the DM is interested in increasing value of each criterion while values of 
others criteria are constant. Thus, it is outlined the class of multicriteria individual choice problem, and it is 
developed the Pareto set reduction axiomatic approach by V.D. Noghin applied to this class
9–12
. 
It is shown
9
 that under assumption the axioms of “reasonable” choice being valid, the Edgeworth – Pareto 
principle for any DMl is hold. It is said that the “best” solution should be chosen only within the set of Pareto-
optimal vectors (the Pareto set) P(Y). Here, ( ) { | : }P Y Y Y     y y y y , also one can consider the set of 
Pareto-optimal solutions ( ) { | : ( ) ( )}P X X X     
f
x x f x f x . The relation 
y y  means that the relations 
i iy y
  are valid for all i = 1, ..., m, and y ≠ y*. It is usually called the Pareto relation. 
To specify the individual choice within the Pareto set it is given some additional information about the preference 
relation 
l
 of the DMl. It is introduced notation of “quantum” of information
9, 11, 12
. Following it let us recall the 
definition. 
Definition 1. It is said that we have a “quantum” of information about the DMl’s preference relation l  with 
groups of criteria A and B and with two sets of positive parameters 
( )l
iw  for all i A  and 
( )l
jw  for all j B  if for all 
vectors 
(1) (2), mRy y  such that 
(1) (2) ( ) 0li i iy y w    i A  , 
(2) (1) ( ) 0lj j jy y w    j B  , 
(1) (2)
s sy y  \ ( )s I A B   , 
where I = {1, …, m}, ,A B I , A ≠ Ø, B ≠ Ø, A∩B = Ø, the following relation is valid: 
(1) (2)
ly y . In such case the  
group of criteria A is called more important, and the group B is called less important with given positive parameters 
( )l
iw  (profits), 
( )l
jw  (losses). 
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Add one more condition to the list of axioms of “reasonable” choice: the preference relation 
l
 for any 
{1, , }l n  is invariant under a linear positive transformation9. Taking it into account it is shown8 that in 
Definition 1 the vectors y
(1)
, y
(2)
 can be assumed to be fixed, in particular, we can put (1) ( )li iy w  i A  , 
(1) ( )l
j jy w   j A  , 
(1) 0sy   \ ( )s I A B   , 
(2)
my 0 . So, the existence of “quantum” of information means that 
it is given a vector mNy ( \ ( ( ) {0 })m m m m mN R R R     ) such that l my 0 . 
In papers
9–12
 in order to specify the individual choice it is shown how to use collections of “quantum” of 
information of different types, which according to the aforementioned could be defined by the sequence of vectors 
( )s mNy , s = 1, …, pl.  And if there exists the preference relation l  satisfied the axioms of “reasonable” choice 
such that ( )s l my 0  for any {1, , }l n , then such information about the DMl’s preference relation is called 
consistent
9
. The inconsistent information could not be used in decision making process. The criteria of consistency 
are derived
9
. The main idea of the Pareto set reduction axiomatic approach is to construct a set, which will restrict a 
“new” bound of individual choice using the given information. And such bound is more precise, than the Pareto set. 
3. The majority preference relation 
Definition 2. A binary relation   defined on mR  is called a cone relation if it is existed a cone K such that the 
following equivalent is hold for any (1) (2), mRy y : (1) (2) (1) (2) K   y y y y . Remark that the inclusion 
(1) (2) K y y  is the same to (1) (2) K y y . 
It is proved
9
 that the preference relation which satisfies the axioms of “reasonable” choice is a cone relation with 
a pointed convex cone (without the origin 0m) that contains the nonnegative orthant { | }
m m
mR R   y y 0 . For that 
reason the preference relation 
l
 of the DMl for any l = 1, …, n is a cone relation with abovementioned preferences. 
Denote such cone Kl for each l . 
Consider a group preference relation, which takes into account the intentions of at least a half of the group. For 
example, if for some vectors 
(1) (2), mRy y  the relations (1) (2)1y y , 
(1) (2)
2y y , …, 
(1) (2)
qy y  are valid, where q 
is greater than n/2, then the relation 
(1) (2)
y y  holds. 
Definition 3. Let us call the group preference relation  defined on mR  the majority preference relation if for 
any vectors 
(1) (2), mRy y  the relation (1) (2)y y  is equivalent to the existence of such subset 1{ , , } {1, , }pl l n  
that the relations 
(1) (2)
jl
y y  are valid for all j = 1, …, p, where p = n/2, if p is even, and 1
2
n
p
 
  
 
, if p is odd. 
Here for any number a by [a] we denote an integer part of number a. Consider the cone 
 
1 1
p
nC p
lj
l j
K K
 
  (1) 
where 1{ , , }l lpK K  is the subset of the set of the cones 1{ , , }nK K  of preference relations l , l = 1, …, n. 
Remark that for any , {1, , }l k n , l k , subsets 1{ , , }l lpK K  and 1{ , , }k kpK K  do not coincide, 
p
nС  – p-
combination of a set {1, …, n}. Obviously, K is a cone as unions and intersections of cones. 
Lemma 1. The majority preference relation  is a cone relation with cone K. 
Proof. It means that it is sufficient to establish the following equivalent: 
(1) (2) (1) (2) K  y y y y . 
Necessity. According to Definition 3 if the relation 
(1) (2)
y y  holds, then there exists such subset 
1{ , , } {1, , }pl l n  that the relations 
(1) (2)
jl
y y  are valid for all j = 1, …, p, where p = n/2, if p is even, and 
1
2
n
p
 
  
 
, if p is odd. Since the preference relation s of the DMs for any s = 1, …, n is a cone relation with the 
appropriate cone Ks, there exists a subset 1 1{ , , } { , , }l lp nK K K K  that 
(1) (2)
ljK y y  for all j = 1, …, p. This 
implies the inclusion 
(1) (2)
1
p
lj
j
K

 y y , and we have (1) (2) K y y . 
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Sufficiency. Let the inclusion (1) (2) K y y  is valid. It means that there exists such number {1, , }pnl C  that 
(1) (2)
1
p
lj
j
K

 y y , so we obtain that the inclusion (1) (2)
ljK y y  is true for any {1, , }j p . This implies the 
relation 
(1) (2)
jl
y y , where 
jl
 is the relation appropriate to the cone Klj. As a result we have that for some number 
{1, , }pnl C  we specified such subset 1{ , , } {1, , }pl l n  that the relations 
(1) (2)
jl
y y  are valid for any 
{1, , }j p . According to Definition 3 the relation (1) (2)y y  holds. Lemma 1 is proved. 
We obtained that the group preference relation defined in Definition 3 is a cone relation. Now consider the 
properties of this relation and its cone. 
Lemma 2. The majority preference relation  is an irreflexive relation, invariant under a linear positive 
transformation, and its cone K contains the nonnegative orthant mR , and does not contain the origin 0m. 
Proof. a) Let us prove that the relation  is invariant under a linear positive transformation. Consider two 
arbitrary vectors (1) (2), mRy y  such that (1) (2)y y  holds. Since the relation  is a cone relation with cone K 
defined in (1), we have (1) (2) K y y . This is equivalent to the inclusion (1) (2) K  y y  for any nonzero α, 
because the set K is a cone. For any arbitrary vector mRc  we obtain 
(1) (2) (1) (2)( ) ( )K K         y y y с y с . The right hand side inclusion is equivalent to the relation 
(1) (2)( ) ( )  y с y с . As a result, the relation  is invariant under a linear positive transformation. 
b) It is easy to see from Definition 3 that the relation  is irreflexive due to the property of irrefexivity of all 
relations 
1
, …, 
n
 (it can be proved by contradiction). 
c) Due to the inclusions 
m
lR K   and 0m lK  for any {1, , }l n , it is obvious that 
mR K   and 0m K . 
Lemma 2 is proved. 
In spite of cones 
lK  for all {1, , }l n  are pointed and convex, in general, the cone K is not pointed and convex. 
The property of convex for cone means that corresponding cone relation is transitive
9
. One can obtain it using the 
definition of the transitivity and the fact that for any convex cone Kˆ  and for any arbitrary vectors (1) (2) ˆ, Ky y  the 
inclusion (1) (2) Kˆ y y  is hold. Let Kˆ  be the convex cone such that Kˆ K , call this cone Kˆ  a transitive part of 
the cone K. And if it does not exist a convex cone K K  that ˆK K , ˆK K , then call this cone Kˆ  a maximum 
transitive part of the cone K. In general, it is not a unique for particular cone K.  Similarly, let us call the 
corresponding cone relations 
tr
 and 
max tr
 a transitive part and a maximum transitive part of the majority 
preference relation . 
It is obvious that ˆmR K  , 
ˆ0m K , then the relation tr  is irreflexive, transitive, and invariant under a linear 
positive transformation.  Denote by Ndom ( )
tr
Y  the set of nondominated vectors of the set Y according to an 
arbitrary transitive part 
tr
 of the relation , i. e. ˆNdom ( ) { | : }
tr
Y Y Y K      y y y y . The inclusion 
ˆmR K   implies the inclusion Ndom ( ) ( )tr Y P Y . 
If for any {1, , }l n  DMl has not any additional information about its preference relation l , i. e. there is not 
“quantum” of information about the relation 
l
, then the corresponding cone Kl coincides with the nonnegative 
orthant 
mR . And we have that the cone 
mK R . In such case all three relations , tr , and   coincide, and all 
vectors of the Pareto set form a group choice. But the reducing this choice is arisen in practice. The goal is to 
construct a transitive part Kˆ  of the cone K using “quanta” of information about the DMs’ preference relations. The 
set of nondominated vectors Ndom ( )
tr
Y  of the set Y according to this transitive part Kˆ  will be considered as a 
group choice based on the given “quanta” of information, and Ndom ( ) ( )
tr
Y P Y . So it reduces the bounds of 
group choice. 
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4. Group choice using the majority preference relation in case of 3 DMs and m = 2 
4.1. Case of one “quantum” of information for each DM 
Consider the group consists of 3 DMs, each of them is associated to its preference relation with corresponding 
cone: DM1 with 1  (cone K1), DM2 with 2  (cone K2), DM3 with 3  (cone K3). Assume that preference relations 1 , 
2
, and 
3
 are satisfied the axioms of “reasonable” choice, so cone Kl is convex and pointed, 
2
lR K  , and 
2 lK0  for any {1, 2, 3}l . Let f = (f1, f2), it means that m = 2. 
According to Definition 3 and Lemma 1 the majority preference relation  is a cone relation with a cone 
 
1 2 1 3 2 3( ) ( ) ( )K K K K K K K      . (2) 
Lemma 3. If the cone K defined in (2) is convex, then Kˆ K . If the cone K is not convex, then an arbitrary 
transitive part is a cone 1 2 (1) (2)
2
ˆ cone{ , , , }\{ }K  e e u u 0 , where the vectors 
(1) (1) (1)
1 2( , )
Tu u u , (2) (2) (2)1 2( , )
Tu u u , 
(1) (2), Ku u  , with components (1) (1) (2) (2)1 2 1 2, , , 0u u u u   satisfy the inequality 
 (1) (2) (1) (2)1 2 2 1 0u u u u  . (3) 
And it does not exist the maximum transitive part of the cone K. 
Proof. In case the cone K is convex, then, obviously, Kˆ K . Consider the case, when the cone K is not convex. 
The cone K does not contain the set 2( )R . If we assume that any arbitrary vector 
2( )R y  belongs to the cone K, 
then there exists such number {1, 2, 3}i  that for cone Ki the following inclusion is hold: iKy . It implies the 
condition 
i my 0 , which contradicts with the axioms of “reasonable” choice of the DMi. Thus, 
2( )R K  . 
According to Lemma 2 the inclusion 
mR K   is hold. If 
mK R , then, obviously, the cone K is convex. It 
should be noted that the case 
mK R  has not practical sense, because this implies that the relation  coincides with 
the Pareto relation  . 
As a result, due to 
2( )R K   and 
mR K  , there exist two vectors 
(1) (1) (1)
1 2( , )
Tu u u , (2) (2) (2)1 2( , )
Tu u u  
with components (1) (1) (2) (2)1 2 1 2, , , 0u u u u  , which belong to K. Consider the cone 
1 2 (1) 2 (2)ˆ cone{ , , } cone{ , }K  e e u e u  without the origin 02. 
Let us prove that the cone Kˆ  is convex if and only if (3). Consider the line l passing through the vector 
(2)
u , its 
equation is , 0n y , where 
(2) (2)
2 1( , )
Tu un  is a normal vector. Note that in case (1) lu  the cone Kˆ  is not 
convex due to 
2 Kˆ0 , 2 l0 . If the vector 
(1)
u generates an acute angle with the normal vector n, i. e. 
(1) (1) (2) (1) (2)
1 2 2 1, 0u u u u  n u , then the cone Kˆ  is convex, and it is generated by the vectors e
1
, e
2
, u
(1)
, u
(2)
, and 
does not contain the origin 02. We can conclude that the cone Kˆ  in case (3) is an arbitrary transitive part of the 
cone K. 
As assumed above the vectors 
(1) (2), Ku u , and the cone K is not convex. Hence, there be one of two 
possibilities: 1) there exists such vector 
(1) (1) (1)
1 2( , )v v K  v , 
(1) (1)
1 2, 0v v  , that 
(1) (2) (1) (2)
1 2 2 1 0v u v u  , or 2) there 
exists such vector 
(2) (2) (2)
1 2( , )v v K  v , 
(2) (2)
1 2, 0v v  , that 
(1) (2) (1) (2)
1 2 2 1 0u v u v  . Consider the second one, for the 
first one arguments are similar. Obviously, 
1 2 (1) 2 (2)
2(cone{ , , } cone{ , }) \{ } K e e u e v 0 . 
There exists such number ε > 0 that 
 
(2) (1)
(2) (2) 1 2
2 2 (1)
1
u u
u u
u
   . (4) 
This implies the inequality 
(1) (2) (1) (2)
1 2 2 1( ) 0u u u u   . So, the cone 
1 2 (1) 2 ( )ˆ cone{ , , } cone{ , }K   e e u e u  without 
the origin 02, where 
( ) (2) (2)
1 2( , )
Tu u   u , is convex. It is easy to check that the equality u(2) = u(ε) + εe2 is true. It 
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means that the inclusion ˆ ˆK K  is hold. Using (4) and 
(1) (2) (1) (2)
1 2 2 1 0u v u v   one can check that the linear 
combination u
(ε)
 = α1v
(2)
 + α2e
2
 is valid for some positive numbers α1, α2. Thus, 
( ) 2 (2)cone{ , } u e v . And we obtain 
the inclusion Kˆ K  . 
We have shown that for any arbitrary transitive part Kˆ  there exists a convex cone Kˆ K   that 
ˆ ˆK K , 
ˆ ˆK K  . It means that if the cone K is not convex, then it does not exist the maximum transitive part of it. Lemma 3 
is proved. 
Now, let each DMl give a “quantum” of information about its preference relation l , l = 1, 2, 3. Due to this, we 
have 3 vectors (1) (2) (3) 2, , Ny y y  such that (1) 1 2y 0 , 
(2)
2 2y 0 , and 
(3)
3 2y 0 . There are two and only two 
situations: (I) the index of positive component is the same for all vectors, for example ( )1 0
ly   for any {1, 2, 3}l ; 
(II) only two vectors have positive component with the same index, for example (1)1 0y  , 
(2)
1 0y  , 
(3)
2 0y  . Firstly, 
we consider the situation (I). Denote ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 2 1( , )
l s l sW l s w w w w  . 
Theorem 1. Let the situation (I) is hold, and the vectors 
(1)
(1) 1
(1)
2
w
w
 
  
 
y , 
(2)
(2) 1
(2)
2
w
w
 
  
 
y , and 
(3)
(3) 1
(3)
2
w
w
 
  
 
y  
such that 
(1)
1 2y 0 , 
(2)
2 2y 0 , and 
(3)
3 2y 0  are given. It is assumed that these vectors are not codirectional. 
Then ˆ ( ) ( )P Y P Yg , where 
ˆ ( ) ( ( ))P Y f P X
g g , and 1 1g f , 
( ) ( )
2 2 1 1 2
s sg w f w f  . Here the index {1, 2, 3}s   is 
selected as follows: it satisfies the inequalities ( , ) 0W l s  , ( , ) 0W s k   for some indices , {1, 2, 3}l k , l ≠ k, l ≠ s, 
k ≠ s. Note that there is only one such index s for particular components of vectors y(1), y(2), and y(3). 
Proof. Let 
1 2 ( )
2cone{ , , } \{ }
l
lM  e e y 0  for any {1, 2, 3}l . 
Let us show that for cones Ml, Ms for any , {1, 2, 3}l s , l ≠ s, it is valid either inclusion l sM M  or inclusion 
s lM M . Suppose that the condition ( , ) 0W l s   is hold. Consider an arbitrary vector lMy . According to the 
definition of cone Ml we derive that it is existed nonnegative numbers λ1, λ2, and µl such that 
1 2 ( )
1 2
l
l    y e e y . 
It is easy to check that the vector y
(l)
 can be represented as a linear combination 
( ) 1 ( )
1 2
l s  y e y , where 
( )
1 2( , ) /
sW l s w  , ( ) ( )2 2 2/
l sw w  . In other words, we establish that 1 2 ( )1 2
s
l    y e e y , where due to 
( , ) 0W l s   numbers 1 , 2 , and l  are nonnegative. It means that sMy , so we have l sM M  in case of 
( , ) 0W l s  . Similarly, it can be obtained that the inclusion s lM M  is valid, if ( , ) 0W l s  . It should be noted that 
here we consider only strong inclusions 
l sM M  and l sM M . The equality l sM M  is possible if and only if 
( , ) 0W l s  . 
Summarizing the previous analysis we can make a conclusion. The cones M1, M2, and M3 satisfy the inclusions 
l s kM M M  , where indices , , {1, 2, 3}l s k , l ≠ s ≠ k. Obviously, in such case the inequalities ( , ) 0W l s   and 
( , ) 0W s k   are hold. (Remark that ( , ) 0W l s   and ( , ) 0W s k   leads to ( , ) 0W l k  ). Due to this, the intersections 
of the cones are as follows: 
l s lM M M  , l k lM M M  , s k sM M M  . As a result we obtain M = Ms. It 
means that the cone M in situation (I) is convex, also it contains nonnegative orthant 2R , and does not contain the 
origin 02. One can conclude that the cone relation 
sM
with the cone Ms is irreflexive, transitive, and invariant under 
a linear positive transformation
9
. 
As a result, the relation 
sM
 is a transitive part of the majority preference relation . From the inclusion 
2
sR M   we have Ndom ( ) ( )
sM
Y P Y , where Ndom ( )
sM
Y  – is the set of nondominated vectors of the set Y 
according to the relation 
sM
: Ndom ( ) { | : }
sM s
Y Y Y M      y y y y . 
One can prove that the cone Ms coincides with the set of all nonzero solutions of the following system of linear 
inequalities: 
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1 , 0e y , ( )ˆ , 0s y y , 
where ( ) ( ) ( )2 1ˆ ( , )
s s s Tw wy . Here by ,a b we denote a scalar product of two vectors 
2, Ra b , i. e. 
1 1 2 2, a b a b a b . For any arbitrary nonequal vectors y, y* the inclusion sM
 y y  is equivalent to the system of 
the inequalities 1, 0 e y y , ( )ˆ , 0s  y y y , where at least one of this inequalities is strict. From here one can 
conclude that the set of nondominated vectors Ndom ( )
sM
Y  is the image of the Pareto-optimal solutions ( )P Xg  in 
the multicriteria problem with the criteria g under mapping f, where g has the following components 
1 1g f , 
( ) ( )
2 2 1 1 2
s sg w f w f  . It means ˆ ( ) ( ( ))P Y f P Xg g . Thus, the set 
ˆ ( )P Y
g  is the group choice according the majority 
preference relation  and given “quanta” of information. Theorem 1 is proved. 
Remark that in the opposite case to Theorem 1, when all second components of the vectors y
(1)
, y
(2)
, and y
(3)
  are 
positive, and all first components are negative, one should renumber the components. 
Now, consider situation (II): only two vectors have positive component with the same index. 
Theorem 2. Let situation (II) is hold, and the vectors 
(1)
(1) 1
(1)
2
w
w
 
  
 
y , 
(2)
(2) 1
(2)
2
w
w
 
  
 
y , and 
(3)
(3) 1
(3)
2
w
w
 
  
 
y  
such that (1) 1 2y 0 , 
(2)
2 2y 0 , and 
(3)
3 2y 0  are given. It is assumed that vectors y
(1)
 and y
(2)
 are not 
codirectional. Then ˆ ( ) ( )P Y P Yg , where 
ˆ ( ) ( ( ))P Y P X
g g
f , and 
1 1g f , 
(1) (1)
2 2 1 1 2g w f w f  , if (1, 2) 0W   is 
valid, or (2) (2)2 2 1 1 2g w f w f  , if (1, 2) 0W   is valid. 
Proof. Let 
1 2 ( )
2cone{ , , } \{ }
l
lM  e e y 0  for any {1, 2, 3}l . According to the proof of Theorem 1 in the similar 
way we can obtain that if (1, 2) 0W  , then the inclusion 1 2M M  is hold that implies 1 2 1M M M  . And in 
case of (1, 2) 0W   the inclusion 2 1M M  is valid that implies 1 2 2M M M  . 
One can prove that for the cones M1 and M3 the intersection 1 3M M  is equal to nonnegative orthant 
2R , also 
2
2 3M M R  . Check this statement for the cones M1 and M3, for the cones M2 and M3 it can be done in a similar 
way. The cone M1 coincides with the set of all nonzero solutions of the following system of linear inequalities: 
 1 (1)ˆ, 0, , 0, e y y y   (5) 
where 
(1) (1) (1)
2 1
ˆ ( , )Tw wy , and the cone M3 – with the system 
 2 (3)ˆ, 0, , 0, e y y y   (6) 
where 
(3) (3) (3)
2 1
ˆ ( , )Tw wy . For system of inequalities (5), (6) one can find the fundamental set of solutions, which 
consists of the vectors e
1
, e
2
. For that reason 
2
1 3M M R  . 
As a result, we have 
2 2
1 1M M R R M     , if (1, 2) 0W  , and 
2 2
2 2M M R R M      in case (1, 2) 0W  . 
It means that in situation (II) the cone M is also convex. Thus, we can conclude that the relation M  is a transitive 
part of the majority preference relation , M K . Using analogous arguments as in Theorem 1 one can ends the 
proof of the theorem. Theorem 2 is proved. 
Remark that if among the vectors y
(1)
, y
(2)
, and y
(3)
 there are two vectors with second positive component and first 
negative component, one should renumber the components to use Theorem 2. 
4.2. Case of two “quanta” of information for each DM 
Now consider the situation, when each DM has two “quanta” of information. Thus, let there exist such vectors 
(1) (1) (1)
1 2( , )
Tw w y , (2) (2) (2)1 2( , )
Tw w y , and (3) (3) (3)1 2( , )
Tw w y , which are not codirectional, that (1) 1 2y 0 , 
8 Zakharov/ Procedia Computer Science 00 (2014) 000–000 
(2)
2 2y 0 , and 
(3)
3 2y 0 , and such vectors 
(1) (1) (1)
1 2( , )
Tv v y , (2) (2) (2)1 2( , )
Tv v y , and (3) (3) (3)1 2( , )
Tv v y , which 
are not codirectional, that (1) 1 2y 0 , 
(2)
2 2y 0 , and 
(3)
3 2y 0 . Let for any {1, 2, 3}l  the condition 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 2 1 0
l l l lw v w v    (7) 
is valid. The implementation of formulae (7) means that for any {1, 2, 3}l  the “quanta” of information of the DMl 
given by the vectors (1)y , (2)y , and (3)y  are consistent
12
. Denote ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 1 1 2( , )
l s l sV l s v v v v  . 
Theorem 3. Let there be two consistent “quanta” of information of the DMl given by the vectors 
( )l
y , ( )ly  for 
any {1, 2, 3}l , as defined above. It is existed the indices 1 2, {1, 2, 3}s s   such the inequalities 1 1( , ) 0W l s  , 
1 1( , ) 0W s k  , 2 2( , ) 0V l s  , and 2 2( , ) 0V s k   are hold for some indices , , {1, 2, 3}q q ql s k  , lq ≠ kq, lq ≠ sq, kq ≠ sq 
for any {1, 2}q . Also assume that 1 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 2 1 0
s s s s
w v w v   is valid. Then ˆ ( ) ( )P Y P Yg , where 
ˆ ( ) ( ( ))P Y P X
g g
f , 
and 2 2
( ) ( )
1 2 1 1 2
s s
g v f v f  , 1 1( ) ( )2 2 1 1 2
s s
g w f w f  . Note that there are only ones such indices s1, s2 for particular 
components of vectors y
(1)
, y
(2)
, and y
(3)
. 
Proof. Denote by Ml a cone generated by the vectors 
1
e , 2e , 
( )l
y , and ( )ly  (without the origin 02), i. e. 
1 2 ( ) ( )
2cone{ , , , } \{ }
l l
lM  e e y y 0 , which is convex and pointed due to (7). The cone Ml can be considered as union 
of two cones 1 1 2 ( ) 2cone{ , , } \{ }
l
lM  e e y 0  and 
2 1 2 ( )
2cone{ , , } \{ }
l
lM  e e y 0 . According to the proof of Theorem 1 
for any , {1, 2, 3}l s , l ≠ s, it is valid either inclusion q ql sM M  or inclusion 
q q
s lM M , where q = 1, 2. From here 
one can conclude that for any {1, 2}q  the cones 1
qM , 2
qM , and 3
qM  satisfy the inclusions 
q q q
q q q
l s kM M M  , 
where indices , , {1, 2, 3}q q ql s k  , lq ≠ kq, lq ≠ sq, kq ≠ sq. Evidently, in such case the inequalities 1 1( , ) 0W l s  , 
1 1( , ) 0W s k  , 2 2( , ) 0V l s  , and 2 2( , ) 0V s k   are hold. 
As a result, we have that unions of intersections 
1 2
1 2
1 2 1 3 2 3( ) ( ) ( ) s sM M M M M M M M M        . It is 
easy to see that cones 
1
1
sM , 2
2
sM  are convex, but M not should be the same. Similarly to the proof of Lemma 3 one 
can obtain that the cone M is convex if and only if 1 2 1 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2 2 1 0
s s s s
w v w v  . 
It implies that the relation 
M
 is a transitive part of the majority preference relation , M K . One can obtain 
that the cone M  coincides with the set of all nonzero solutions of the following system of linear inequalities: 
(1)ˆ , 0y y , (2)ˆ , 0y y , 
where 2 2
( ) ( )(1)
2 1
ˆ ( , )s s Tv vy , 1 1( ) ( )(2) 2 1ˆ ( , )
s s Tw wy . 
The end of the proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1. Theorem 3 is proved. 
Theorem 4. If in Theorem 3 the inequality 1 2 1 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2 2 1 0
s s s s
w v w v   is not valid, then there exist two vectors 
(1) (1) (1)
1 2( , )
Tu u u , (2) (2) (2)1 2( , )
Tu u u , (1) (2), Ku u  with components (1) (1) (2) (2)1 2 1 2, , , 0u u u u  , which satisfy the 
inequality 
(1) (2) (1) (2)
1 2 2 1 0u u u u   and at least one of the conditions 
2 2( ) ( )(1) (1)
1 2 2 1 0
s s
u v u v    or 1 1
( ) ( )(2) (2)
1 2 2 1 0
s s
w u w u  . 
Then the inclusion ˆ ( ) ( )P Y P Yg  is hold. Here 
ˆ ( ) ( ( ))P Y P X
g g
f , and 
(2) (2)
1 2 1 1 2g u f u f  , 
(1) (1)
2 2 1 1 2g u f u f  . Note 
that the components of the vectors u
(1)
, u
(2)
 are not unique. 
In this case the cone M is not convex, and the proof is based on Lemma 3. Due to the way we choose a convex 
cone in the cone M, the Pareto set ˆ ( )P Yg  as a solution of the group choice problem is not unique. And all such 
Pareto sets are equally “optimal” for the group of the DMs according to the given “quanta” of information about the 
preference relations 
1
, 
2
, 
3
. This is the difference between the result of Theorem 4 and the results of 
Theorems 1–3. 
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5. Example 
Consider the example. Let m = 2, n = 3, i. e. there are 3 DMs, and 2Y R . And let each DMl gives two “quanta” 
of information: there are vectors ( )ly , ( )ly  such ( ) 2
l
ly 0 , 
( )
2
l
ly 0  for any {1, 2, 3}l , where 
(1)
2
1
 
  
 
y , (2)
1
2
 
  
 
y , (3)
3
1
 
  
 
y , (1)
1
1
 
  
 
y , (2)
1
3
 
  
 
y , and (3)
1
4
 
  
 
y . 
One can check that the conditions of Theorem 3 are hold. According to the notation we have l1 = 3, s1 = 1, k1 = 2, 
l2 = 3, s2 = 2, k2 = 1; W(3, 1) = 1, W(1, 2) = 3, V(3, 2) = 1, V(2, 1) = 2. Also the inequality 
(1) (2) (1) (2)
1 2 2 1 5 0w v w v    is 
valid. Then the components of vector criteria g are following: 
1 1 23g f f  , 2 1 22g f f  . Let there be the set of 
feasible vectors Y, which consists of vectors 
(1) (2, 3)Tu , (2) (1, 4)Tu , (3) (5, 2)Tu . It easy to see that P(Y) = Y. 
According to the formula of vector criteria g, we obtain ( ) {(9, 8) , (7, 9) , (17, 9) }T T TG X g . From here, the 
Pareto set ˆ ( ) ( ( ))P Y P Xg gf  consists of vector 
(3)
u , which forms a group choice according to given “quanta” of 
information. 
6. Conclusion 
A model of multicriteria group choice problem is considered in the paper. It is assumed that each DM’s 
preference relation is a cone relation with convex pointed cone, which contains nonnegative orthant, and does not 
contain the origin. Individual preferences are given in terms of “quanta” of information, reflecting the compromise, 
which could be done between two criteria or two groups of criteria. To aggregate individual preferences it is used 
the majority preference relation based on the DMs’ preference relations, and its properties are investigated. It is 
proved that the cone of the majority preference relation, in general, is not convex, and the relation is not transitive. 
In case of three DMs and two criteria it is shown how to use “quanta” of information of each DM for the group 
choice. The set of nondominated vectors according to the majority preference relation is a Pareto set in multicriteria 
problem with “new” vector criteria. In one particular situation when the cone of this relation is not convex the Pareto 
set of “new” problem is not unique. 
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